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Can Islamic Injunctions Indemnify the Structural Flaws of Securitized Debt? 
 
Abstract: Securitization enhances liquidity of debt contracts.  However, its structural 
deficiency at origination has led to the freezing of its secondary market and failure of 
institutions holding the collateral.  This paper builds on key cultural (i.e., Islamic) rulings to 
rectify flaws entrenched in securitized debt stemming from asymmetric information and 
agency issues.  These injunctions help in the efficient underwriting of debt contracts across 
the globe to: (i) redeem its ‘toxicity’; (ii) guarantee liquidity; (iii) alleviate fragility of the 
financial system; and (iv) promote economic growth.  Finally, this study promotes a rethink 
of the current ‘Islamic’ financial system from a narrow literalist juridical perspective to one 
that is grounded in financial economics. 
 
JEL Codes: D53, G10, G20, G28, O16, Z12. 
 
Keywords: Agency cost, collateral, debt default, financial fragility, Islamic injunctions. 
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“Improving the liquidity of the bond market is now the number one item on the asset 
management industry’s agenda” 
Stephen Foley (2014b p. 13) 
1. Introduction  
Securitization is assailed in the recent financial crisis.  The opacity caused by complex 
collateralisation structures and the endemic agency issues of debt securities, is believed to 
have instigated the crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).  This is despite the viability of 
securitization in enhancing liquidity for firms’ receivables (Cohn, 1997); and facilitating 
banks’ balance sheet restructuring, funding and other risks management activities (Loutskina, 
2011). 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009), Heilpern et al. (2009), and Shin, (2009) assert that 
securitization is not entirely blamed for the crisis.  The desire to increase the supply of loans 
is the prime reason, leading to lax underwriting standards and consequently liquidity freeze.  
Essentially, banks failed to efficiently price their lending facilities to be default free (Ebrahim 
and Mathur, 2007).  Apart from accounting for the traditional repercussion of interest rate 
risk on demand and supply of loans, banks have ignored the effect of collateral value 
resilience to economic shocks. 
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on how cultural, that is values emanating from 
Islamic rulings can help alleviate the structural flaws behind securitization of debt, thereby 
mitigating the fragility of the financial system and facilitating economic growth.
1
  Our goal is 
to coherently interpret the Islamic rulings
2
 from a financial and economic perspective, and 
apply the doctrines to improve the resilience of the financial sector of the economy. 
                                                 
1 Our paper is consistent with the views of Stulz and Williamson (2003), Li et al. (2013) and Lievenbrück 
and Schmid (2014), who emphasize the impact of culture (including values extracted from religious 
scriptures) on economic policies and institutions. 
 
2 This is guided by the Islamic scriptures, namely the Qur'ān (Muslim Holy Book) and the Sunnah 
(traditions of Prophet Muhammad). 
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This paper studies the contractual relationship between risk-averse lenders and 
borrowers in a stylized setting.  We proceed with examining the main issues in financial 
contracting, namely asymmetric information and agency costs of debt separately and offer 
solution to this quandary premised on techniques espoused in the established literature.
3
 
A viable and economically efficient securitization option emphasized in this paper is to 
structure default-free loans completely collateralized by tangible assets to curtail risk-
shifting, accompanied with measures to curtail underinvestment issues. Firstly, we interpret 
the Islamic rulings from both financial and economic perspective, and employ them in 
structuring securitized debt claims ensuing from tangible collateral to ensure that information 
asymmetry is mitigated.  In other words, we conceptually model the tradeoff of financial 
claims of a project involving tangible assets.  This constitutes a framework of Rational 
Expectations (i.e. symmetric information).
4
  Secondly, we emulate the model of Ebrahim et 
al. (2014) to illustrate: (i) the economic efficiency of default-free securitization over default-
prone one; and (ii) the mathematical condition yielding illiquidity for default-prone debt, as 
evidenced in the recent crisis.  Finally, we rationalize the verses of the Qur'ān to meticulously 
price debt by alleviating the agency cost of debt. 
Our efforts yield the following contributions to the literature.  First, our approach of 
segregating the twin issues in financial contracting on information asymmetry and agency 
cost of debt differs from present literature which regards the first issue to subsume the second 
(Koziol and Lawrenz, 2010; Salleh et al., 2014).  Second, the Arabic nomenclature 
contrasting tangible assets ('ayn) (and claims backed by them) versus intangible assets 
                                                 
3  Our approach is akin to published articles of scholars who focus on wealth effects of important events, in 
leading economics and finance journals (see Berkowitz et al. 2015).  Yet, their methodology is an adaption 
of the event study formulated in the well-known Fama (1991) paper pertaining to the efficiency of 
financial markets. 
 
4 Rational expectations is defined as “the application of the principle of rational behavior to the acquisition 
and processing of information and to the formation of expectations” (Maddock and Carter, 1982, p.41).  It 
is ‘self-fulfilling’ in the sense that the economic agents form correct expectations, given the pricing model 
and information (Bray, 1981). 
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(constituting of debt/ obligation/ liability ˗ dayn) (and claims backed by them) helps in 
alleviating information asymmetry (gharar).  By securitizing or ensuring the claims are 
backed by tangible assets, lenders would then have access to asset’s historical (ex-post) risk 
and return, which enhances the risk exposure estimation.  Adverse selection is moderated by 
financing the purchase of tangible assets where funds are released in the escrow process when 
title of the tangible asset changes hands.  Moral hazard is also moderated by adhering to the 
Islamic rulings (Qur'ānic verse - 2:282) espousing clear, concise, complete and correct 
documentation of deferred claims.  This facilitates the underwriting of financial facilities in a 
complete market setting spanning each state of the economy. 
Third, we adapt the Lucas tree model (Martin, 2013) to mathematically rationalize the 
Islamic rulings on: (i) the prohibition of ribā (debilitating exchange of financial claims 
elaborated in Section 4); and (ii) injunction of the sale of debt (bay' al-dayn).  These 
respectively forewarn against investing in toxic asset, and stem the degeneration to a default-
prone debt equilibria wrought by illiquidity, as evidenced in the crisis. 
Fourth, the Islamic rulings emphasizing: (i) fragile-free financial contracting (Q 2:280); 
(ii) risk management (Q 4:71, 102); and (iii) judicious undertaking of obligations (including 
that of debt, Q 5:1) help alleviate the agency cost of debt.  This is because efficient pricing of 
facilities at origination, sterilizes the borrower’s put option to default during the tenure of the 
credit facility.  This indemnifies the facility of the risk-shifting (i.e., agency) issue and 
subsequently reduces the funding constraints on borrowers to mitigate the underinvestment 
issue.  This leads to default-free financing, which maintains the value of collateral, ensures 
liquidity of current and future obligation, and leads to stable financial system that is 
beneficial to financial market participants.  Thus, arresting the fragility of the financial 
system rejuvenates economic growth. 
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Finally, our study stimulates a fresh financial economic perspective from the existing 
narrow interpretation of Islamic scholars that is crucial in advancement of legal, 
informational and financial infrastructure to alleviate the perennial underdevelopment of 
emerging Muslim economies. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 reviews the merits and 
shortcomings of securitization.  Section 3 discusses securitization in Muslim economies.  
Section 4 rationalizes the cultural perspective behind the trading of financial claims and 
addresses the deficiencies of securitization.  This includes the mitigation of asymmetric 
information by securitizing only claims backed by real tangible assets, and agency cost of 
debt by meticulously pricing debt at origination thereby moderating both risk-shifting as well 
as under-investment.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Merits and Shortcomings of Securitization 
Securitization is the best alternative of providing liquidity to a firm’s assets through 
transforming long term illiquid financial assets to tradable capital market instruments 
(Mullineux and Murinde, 2003).  Borrowers (as the users of funds), financial institutions (as 
asset originators), and investors (as sources of funds ‒ purchasing securitized assets) all 
benefit from the securitization process (Okabe, 1998).  Securitization endows social benefits, 
described as follows: (i) borrowers secure low cost funding; (ii) originators gain from risk 
management, enhanced performance, inexpensive financing and balance sheet restructuring; 
(iii) investors reap from diversification, higher yield, and opportunity to invest in larger pools 
of Mortgage Backed Securities and Asset Backed Securities.  Securitization thus enhances 
the welfare of market participants, making the financial system more efficient (Greenbaum 
and Thakor, 1987; Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995; Cohn, 1998; Mullineux and Murinde, 
2003; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2012). 
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In contrast to the above, securitization suffers from the following ills: credit risks and 
illiquidity (Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg, 2010; Kara et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2012).
5
  
These ensue from information asymmetry and poor underwriting process that does not cure 
the endemic agency cost of debt (Figure 1).
6
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Not only does this affect the pricing of loans at origination, but it also adversely affects 
investors of the securitized debt instruments by exposing them to illiquidity.  This is a serious 
problem often overlooked.  Illiquidity affects prices of the debt instruments (Nashikkar et al. 
2011) and results in increased bid-ask spread (Bao, et al. 2011).  Liquidity dry ups causes 
defaults within the financial system, affects growth of financial markets, and may even result 
in financial market crashes (Dick-Nielsen et al. 2012; Friewald et al., 2012). 
2.1. Mitigating Information Asymmetry 
The lack of information has a two way impact: both investors and markets are affected.  
This is due to the fact that in the presence of information asymmetry, investors have a 
tendency of viewing the market in a trendy momentum seeking behavior.  That is, lack of 
information forces borrowers and lenders to ‘rely on the most recent events as indicative of 
the future’ (Archer and Smith, 2013 p. 373).  Thereby, adverse markets movements are 
followed by lack of confidence in markets, resulting in market breakdown.  Overall, investors 
are affected by information asymmetry due to its ex-ante (adverse selection) and ex-post 
(moral hazard) effects. 
  
                                                 
5  Complex securitization aggravates opacity of the securitized assets.  In addition, it causes investors to 
overlook information provided by originators, relying entirely on ratings (BIS, 2009).  Thus, these assets 
become Akerlof’s ‘lemons’, leaving investors unaware of their risk exposure. 
 
6  The practitioner literature also attributes illiquidity to a dizzying array of debt issues floated by a firm 
(Foley, 2014b).  For instance, General Electric has 900 kinds of bonds outstanding.  Our paper ignores this 
idiosyncrasy of financial markets. 
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2.1.1. Mitigating Adverse Selection 
Propositions to reduce adverse selection in contracts include screening (Broecker, 
1990), multi-period contracting (Hosios and Peters, 1989), and credit rationing 
(Baltensperger, 1978).  However, credit rationing leads to increased price of the loans (Jaffee 
and Russell, 1976), which eventually results in financial exclusion of poor borrowers. 
In Subsection 4.1, we discuss the Islamic rulings to securitize financial claims backed 
by tangible assets to moderate this issue. 
2.1.2. Mitigating Moral Hazard 
For reducing the effects of moral hazard, the literature suggests various propositions 
including instilling rights to protect return to both parties (Hart, 1988), credit rationing 
(Baltensperger, 1978), and iron-clad covenants (Smith and Warner, 1979).  Also, in the 
securitization process, originators are required to retain the risky residual tranche as a ‘first 
loss position’ or as ‘skin-in-the-game’ incentive, so as to absorb any expected loss.  But this 
induces the problem of ‘selective bias’ (Jobst, 2006).  Originators might neglect monitoring 
or monitor those assets that are solely exposed to the residual tranche at the cost of other 
tranches. 
In Subsection 4.1, we espouse employing Qur'ānic injunction (2: 282) akin to the gist of 
Smith and Warner (1979) encouraging the use of iron-clad covenants on claims backed by 
tangible assets to moderate this issue. 
2.2. Mitigating Agency Cost of Debt 
Securitization of assets involves a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which manages the 
assets and liabilities for the investors.  Although the SPV’s aim is to reduce the originator’s 
moral hazard, this may instead give rise to agency cost of debt, that is, the conflict of interest 
between originator (principal) and SPV (agent).  Here, principal and agent have different 
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objectives as their respective welfare is contingent on the sharing of economic output ensuing 
from the efforts of the agent.  Hence, the SPV may be enticed to meet its own objectives first 
before those of the originator.  The dimensions of agency cost discussed here are risk shifting 
and underinvestment. 
Agency cost of debt can take the form of risk shifting, that is, the intentional 
misallocation of risk by an agent (Barnea, et al. 1981).  It can also comprise of 
underinvestment, that is, an intentional replacement of good investment opportunities for bad 
ones (Barnea, et al., 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
In Subsections 4.2-4.4, we espouse moderating this issue by meticulously pricing 
financial claims, that is controlling for both risk-shifting as well as under-investment issues in 
contrast to the well-known capital structure theorems of Modigliani and Miller (MM-1958, 
1963) and Miller (1977).
7
 
3. Securitization in Muslim Economies 
Despite the strong appeal for securitization, there is a small share of structured financial 
contracts observed in Muslim economies.  One of the reasons cited is the incoherence of 
Islamic rulings in the area of economic development (Ebrahim et al. 2014). This has led to 
allegations that Islamic law has held back the development of the Middle East (Kuran, 2011).  
Connected with this is the rigor applied in the interpretation of Islamic values that is 
necessary to support advancements in financial innovation.  This is evident by the: (i) poor 
legal framework and accounting standards for structured finance; (ii) regulatory 
                                                 
7  The capital structure theorems aggregate the two adversarial (equity and debt) claimants’ objective 
functions.  This deprives the analysis of the agency issues and thus the optimal pricing parameters of debt.  
Furthermore, these theorems are construed in a risk-neutral setting that is similar to a linear programming 
model.  This yields multiple solutions (termed as the invariant result) in the absence of market 
imperfections such as taxes and a corner solution (0% initial equity) under the corporate tax deductibility 
of interest expense.  The capital structure irrelevance result also relies on a strong assumption.  That is, 
individuals resorting to the MM (1958) arbitrage have the same negotiating prowess as that accruing to 
financiers and institutional players.  The Miller (1977) analysis also suffers from the same limitation. 
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inflexibilities; (iii) inadequate market practice, standards of origination, trading and investor 
protection; in addition to (v) a feeble local institutional investor base (see Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003; Jobst, 2007; Li et al., 2013; and Lievenbrück and Schmid, 2014).  It is 
thus not surprising that most of these economies have deeper bank-based, as opposed to a 
market-based, financial system (see Wilson, 2012). 
Empirical studies on securities structured according to Islamic and mainstream finance 
depict differences between the two forms of securitization.  One, Godlewski et al (2013) 
employ event study methodology to illustrate that stocks of firms issuing mainstream bonds 
do not depict any significant market reaction.  In contrast, stocks of firms issuing sukuk 
(bond) depict a significant negative reaction.  This is conducted in a purely Malaysian 
context, without segregating the different profiles of sukuks.  This wealth effect is interpreted 
in a Myers and Majluf (1984) context as an adverse signal implying the sale of participatory 
contracts of lower quality companies requiring monitoring by the issuing firm.  Two, their 
recent 2014 study, again employing the event study methodology, illustrate that the stock 
market reaction is positive for debt like (i.e., leasing) sukuk in contrast to quasi-equity or 
participatory forms.  Furthermore, they also find that the stock market reaction is contingent 
on the reputation and proximity of the scholar endorsing the issuance of the sukuk. 
Another strand of the literature differentiates the risk-return profiles of the two forms of 
securitization.  For instance, Ramaswamy et al. (2011) study the yield and risk (in terms of 
duration and convexity) of the two contrasting groups of securities from a Malaysian 
perspective.  They realize that sukuk are moderately riskier than government bonds while less 
so when compared to conventional bonds.  The returns, however, are higher than government 
bonds but lower than mainstream bonds.  Cakir and Raei (2007) employ a Value-at-Risk 
(VAR) framework to study the risk structure of the two facilities.  They illustrate that the 
secondary market behaviour of sukuk is different from Eurobonds and that there are 
10 
 
 
 
diversification benefits to be gained from the former to reduce the overall risk of the 
portfolio.  This result is corroborated by Paltrinieri et al. (2015) and Abdelsalam et al. (2015) 
detailed below. 
The study by Paltrinieri et al. (2015) finds that sukuk index payoffs are positively 
skewed with a leptokurtic distribution, displaying characteristics similar to high yield bonds 
instead of corporate and developed country government bonds.  They too illustrate 
diversification opportunities through low correlations with other asset classes.  This is also 
confirmed in the recent subprime crisis. 
The study by Abdelsalam et al. (2015) examines the impact of securitization on the 
stability of financial institutions at micro (i.e., individual) and macro (i.e., systemic) level.  
They scrutinize a global sample of Islamic and mainstream banks in 22 countries in the 
period 2003 to 2012, covering 4,887 bank-year observations.  They illustrate that during the 
financial crisis, Islamic banks involved in quasi-equity (i.e., participatory) securitization 
displayed stronger capitalization and better asset quality.  This is despite being less efficient 
due to high monitoring costs of participatory facilities.  However, Islamic banks involved in 
debt sukuk securitization displayed identical capitalization, asset quality and efficiency when 
compared to their mainstream counterparts.  Islamic banks were thus more immune to the 
2008 financial crisis than their mainstream counterparts. 
It is noted that empirical evidence on the value and wealth effects of Islamic rulings in 
securitization is limited due to: (i) constraints in comparing the risk and return profile of the 
two different forms of securitization (i.e., Islamic and mainstream) unless we have the same 
company (or companies with similar risk) issuing the two facilities; (ii) lack of depth in 
securitization data, given that structuring of Islamic papers began in early 2000; this then 
implies (iii) possibilities of glitches appearing attributed to lax underwriting and due 
diligence (see Foster, 2006). 
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We contend that the theoretical value and finance perspective employed in our study 
has the capacity to further improve the resilience of debt oriented sukuk and the banks which 
securitize them.  Furthermore, it would also contribute towards addressing the incoherence in 
interpretation of Islamic rulings that has led the industry to employ ad hoc methods to 
structure Islamic papers across regions of the Muslim world.  For example, Wijnbergen and 
Zaheer (2013) observe that the current ‘asset-based’ sukuk which is permissible by several 
Islamic jurists does aggravate legal risk.  This provides strong support to the employment of 
tangible ‘asset-backed’ sukuk, meticulously configured to alleviate both asymmetric 
information and agency costs of debt to make it truly ‘bankruptcy-remote’, as promoted in 
our study. 
4. Mitigating Financial Fragility with Islamic Injunctions 
This section discusses solutions to each of the issues highlighted in Section 2 from the 
application of Islamic cultural values in securitization, which is presently absent in financial 
contracting literature.  
Asymmetric information (termed as ‘gharar’ in the Arabic nomenclature) is addressed 
by resorting to securitization of assets backed by tangible assets (termed as ‘ayn’).  The 
reason behind this, as discussed in Subsection 4.1, is to imbue transparency to assets being 
financed in order to alleviate adverse selection.  Next, we mitigate moral hazard by resorting 
to Qurʹānic injunction (2: 282) mandating clear, concise, complete and correct documentation 
of deferred claims. 
This still leaves a residual toxicity emanating from agency cost of debt.  This is 
illustrated by us via a conceptual model in Section 4.2.  We adapt the well-known Lucas 
Asset Pricing Model, based on Rational Expectations (see Martin, 2013), to illustrate the 
toxicity of financial claims with endemic agency costs of debt (see Proposition, Section 4.3).  
This results in the inability to price such debt contracts and thus illustrates the inability of 
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financial institutions to detoxify themselves, as observed in the recent subprime crisis.  
Finally, we illustrate an algorithm developed in Ebrahim (2009) in Section 4.4 as an antidote 
to this endemic toxicity by structuring debt (evaluating an optimal loan to value ratio - LTV 
and tenure) to mitigate both risk-shifting as well as underinvestment issue of agency cost of 
debt. 
This approach is consistent with scholars such as Berkowitz et al. (2015), who emulate 
Fama (1991).  Our contribution, described below, is distinct in that it involves integration of 
the disparate techniques developed in various strands of the literature and recalibrating them 
to indemnify the issues with securitization. 
4.1. Employing Islamic Injunctions to Alleviate Information Asymmetry 
The study of cultural values advocated in this paper involves reinterpreting centuries 
old Islamic injunctions of ribā, gharar and that of bai’ al-dayn (detailed below) from a 
financial economic perspective which departs from the literalist (narrow) approach of 
classical Muslim jurists. 
a) Ribā:  This is one of the most fundamental injunctions in Islam. It entails the 
safeguarding of property rights (Ebrahim et al., 2014).
8,
 
9
  The rationale behind this 
injunction, in the realm of financial contracting, is to avoid non-sustainable 
equilibria, where the resources of either a lender or a borrower are being 
expropriated.  This can ensue either under risk shifting and/or underinvestment, 
                                                 
8  This interpretation stems from the Qur'ān, which vehemently denounces expropriation of another person’s 
assets through either spot or deferred trade (Q 2:279; 3:130; 4:161; 30:39).  It should be noted that this 
encompasses the trading of financial claims.  In contrast, the religious establishment in Islam has 
traditionally interpreted the term ribā literally from the Arabic word implying ‘growth’ or ‘expansion’ (Al-
Zuhayli, 2003).  They have deduced the term to imply all forms of plain vanilla debt contracting as it 
implies debt payment in excess of principal (Pryor, 2007).  This implies that they do not have any clue on 
the link between expropriation and agency issues. 
 
9  Despite the denouncement of expropriation, the Muslim world gave in to all forms of autocracy, retarding 
its development and growth (Ebrahim et al., 2014).  The traditions of Prophet Muhammad vehemently 
denounce any form of market manipulation.  Yet, the Muslim world ignores these to form cartels in 
commodity markets to expropriate assets from commodity importing countries. 
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issues associated with agency costs of debt.  This paper focuses on the moderation of 
the avenues of expropriation (i.e., the agency issues) in Sections 4.2-4.4.  This is 
because the cost of funding is contingent on the agency costs of debt (Koziol and 
Lawrenz, 2010; Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg, 2010).  Ameliorating the agency issues 
sterilizes the ‘toxicity’ of risky debt as illustrated in Subsection 4.4.  This in turn 
allows the reduction in the cost of funding, thereby facilitating the acceptance of 
more viable projects to boost economic growth.
10
 
The ribā injunction has led to the development of a nomenclature in Arabic, which 
terms a real tangible asset as an “'ayn” and a non-tangible asset like a debt or 
liability or an obligation as a “dayn” (Al-Zuhayli, 2003).  The rationale for this 
segregation conveys a crucial meaning from a finance perspective, even though it 
was conceptualized roughly 1400 years ago. 
A tangible asset (ayn), such as real estate and commodities, has physical attributes 
and can be valued (priced) easily.
11
  This allows one to evaluate its ex-post risk and 
return, thus giving an investor an estimate of its ex-ante risk and return.  This allows 
lenders to alleviate adverse selection, emanating from ex-ante information 
asymmetry.  This is accomplished by releasing funds in the escrow process, where 
the title of the tangible asset is exchanged for cash.  Thus “'ayn” confers 
transparency to the ownership of tangible asset and financial claims backed by 
tangible assets.  In other words, ownership of tangible assets and financial claims 
backed by these assets alleviate adverse selection. 
                                                 
10  The Qur'ān also provides guidance on deferred exchanges of financial claims, also categorized under this 
injunction.  This includes asking lenders to give respite to borrowers (Q2: 280), implying the structuring of 
fragile free contracts.  The final issue on ribā pertains to financial exclusion.  It is deduced from the 
contrast the scripture draws between it and charity (Q 2:276-277, 30:39).  This last issue is not discussed in 
this paper. 
 
11  See also Hall (2012) for an empirical relationship between asset tangibility and leverage over various 
institutional environments. 
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In contrast, securitization practised in the developed world centres on cash flows 
emanating from claims on intangible assets, such as music royalties and credit card 
payments.  These assets lack physical substance and are difficult to value.  The risk 
of default endemic in debt or liability or an obligation exacerbates the difficulty in 
pricing of these assets, as illustrated below.  This confers opacity to these assets and 
to financial claims backed by them.  The opacity behind these assets and claims 
against them is termed in Arabic as “gharar”, described below. 
Next, we mitigate moral hazard emanating from the ex-post change in borrower’s 
behaviour by adhering to the Qur'ānic injunction (2: 282) encouraging clear, concise, 
complete and correct documentation of deferred claims against tangible assets.
12
  
This is accomplished by mandating the following in the covenant of the credit 
facility: (i) minimum maintenance of the asset; (ii) payment of taxes; and (iii) 
adequate insurance coverage (Salleh et al. 2014). 
b) Gharar:  This involves market manipulation stemming from asymmetric information 
(Thomas, 1995).
13
  This definition is consistent with the views of Greenbaum and 
Thakor (1987) and Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995).  This has credence in the light of 
the recent market manipulating scandals involving London inter-bank offer rate 
(LIBOR) fixing, Gold price fixing etc.
14,
 
15
 
                                                 
12  This ‘iron-clad’ documentation akin to Smith and Warner (1979) facilitates the underwriting of 
collateralized loans in a complete market setting, where contracts spanning each state of the economy are 
clearly and unambiguously written.  This reinforces the institutional infrastructure by enforcing property 
rights and providing judicial interpretation in any possible gaps in contracting.  This ultimately boosts the 
well-functioning of financial and capital markets. 
 
13  The definition of Thomas (1995) incorporates the views of the well-known Andalusian jurist Averroes (Ibn 
Rushd).  The injunction is deduced from the Qur'ānic verses (2:219, 5:91) on gambling.  The jurists have 
employed it to curtail the risk loving tendencies inherent in some economic agents. 
 
14  Another perspective on gharar is provided by El-Gamal (2009), who defines it as ‘trading in risk’.  This 
view is consistent with Tavakoli (2008) and that of Claessens et al. (2012).  This paper, however, finds the 
above definition by Thomas (1995) to be more relevant to our study. 
 
15  See http://www.ft.com/indepth/libor-scandal, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324077704578358381575462340. 
15 
 
 
 
Credit facilities or financial claims, which are inadequately collateralized by tangible 
assets (ayn) mitigate asymmetric information (gharar), but not the agency cost of 
debt.  This is attributed to the risk of default.  Stewart Meyers (2001, p. 96) 
corroborates this when he states: “Conflicts between debt and equity investors only 
arise when there is a risk of default.  If debt is free of default risk, debt holders have 
no interest in the income, value or risk of the firm.  But if there is a chance of 
default, then shareholders gain at the expense of debt investors”.  This probably 
forms the basis for the injunction of sale of debt (bay' al-dayn), as described below.  
The rationale behind the injunction seems to be expropriation of assets of lenders at 
the hands of the borrowers (equity holders).  In the Arabic terminology, this 
transaction constitutes as ribawī (i.e., contains elements of ribā). 
In contrast, financial claims, which are inadequately collateralized by intangible 
assets (dayn) cannot mitigate both asymmetric information as well as agency cost of 
debt.  These are akin to leveraged loans: (i) prevalent in the structure of a retail 
financial intermediary (i.e., banks) which invests in loans that are leveraged against 
deposits; or (ii) employed in the carry trade.  These are classified under the 
nomenclature of sale of debt for debt (or offsetting of debt by debt – i.e. Bay' al-
dayn bi’l-dayn).16  In the Arabic terminology, this constitutes both ribā as well as 
gharar.  This exacerbates the fragility of the financial system.
17
 
c) Bay' al-dayn (Sale of Debt): This issue is quite controversial, as the religious 
scholars from different regions of the Muslim world (e.g., Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries versus Malaysia) are in variance with each other (Amin, 2007).  This 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 Trading debt for debt has a multiplier effect on leverage in the economy as it magnifies the size of the 
financial sector disproportionate to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Singh and Aitken, 2010). 
 
17 We do not discuss this issue in the current paper, as it is not related to securitization.  But we are ready to 
provide a conceptual illustration on the same upon request. 
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injunction stems from a tradition ('hadīth) of Prophet Muhammad, whose 
authenticity is disputed (Kamali, 2000).  Furthermore, the precise definition of this 
transaction and the forms it can take is also disputed.  Finally, there is a 
disagreement on whether a consensus amongst jurist has materialized banning the 
same (Kamali, 2000).  Nonetheless, from a financial economics perspective, we are 
of the view that the sale of an inadequately collateralized debt does not mitigate the 
agency cost of debt.  That is, it has the capacity to lead to risk shifting and/or 
underinvestment, which leads to expropriation of the assets of economic agents.  In 
other words, it is endemic of the banned ribā.  In contrast, the offsetting (or sale) of 
one debt for another does not mitigate both asymmetric information as well as 
agency cost of debt.  It is thus endemic of both ribā and gharar.  We elaborate on 
the first issue in the subsections below.  We do not focus on the second issue as it is 
not related to securitization.  We are willing to provide more information on it upon 
request. 
4.2. Mitigating the Agency Costs of Debt under Islamic Injunctions 
This subsection along with the following two focuses on moderating agency issues 
endemic in plain vanilla financing.  We first elaborate on our model (in Subsection 4.2.1), 
explain default-free, default-prone equilibria and the freezing of debt market (in Subsections 
4.22/3-4.3) sequentially.  We subsequently describe ways of moderating the risk-shifting and 
under-investment issues by meticulously pricing the loan parameters. 
4.2.1. Modelling the Collateralized Debt Facility 
We assume a two-period financial system, described in Ebrahim et al. (2014), where an 
entrepreneur-manager has access to a project, requiring a fixed amount of investment in 
tangible assets.  This investment is constrained by his/ her initial wealth.  The entrepreneur’s 
financing is addressed through trading non-recourse financial claim (involving a credit 
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facility) that is collateralized against the underlying project payoffs, comprising of the net 
operating income (NOI) along with the liquidating value of the project.
18
  The payoffs 
(composed of NOI and terminal asset value) follow an ergodic Markov process, whose 
probability distributions are known to the lender and borrower.  The trading of collateralized 
financial claims can either be structured on a (i) default-free; or (ii) default-prone basis, as 
explained below (see Figure 2).  In the context of our study, a default-free debt is construed 
as adequately collateralized, while the default-prone debt is classified as inadequately 
collateralized. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
4.2.2. Default-free debt equilibrium 
We define a pragmatically default-free collateralized debt equilibrium as one that does 
not allow the put option to default to be significantly in-the-money.  That is, the terminal 
project payoffs exceed the balance of the credit facility over its tenure (in all states of the 
economy) with very high probability (see Figure 2).  The criticality of ensuring the payoffs 
from depreciating to a substantial negative equity value over the tenure of the credit facility is 
consistent with Foote et al. (2008), and Archer and Smith (2013), who observe non-linearity 
in the put option to default.
19
  This stresses a dynamic approach in the debt pricing 
mechanism to endogenously mitigate the conflict of interest between borrower and lender 
(i.e. agency cost of debt).  On a micro-level, default-free collateralized lending alleviates 
credit and liquidity risk of the lender, given the put option to default is never significantly in-
the-money.  Furthermore, the borrower enjoys a favorable cost of debt, given the nearly 
                                                 
18  Financial claims employing the ‘Islamic’ credit facility are generally structured as a buy-sell agreement, 
where a mark-up rate is employed in lieu of an interest rate.  This is because the religious establishment 
narrowly interprets interest for the banned ribā (Khan, 2010). 
 
19  Both studies observe that home mortgage borrowers do not default the moment their equity goes 
‘underwater’.  Default, basically occurs when there is substantial erosion in their home (property) equity 
values.    
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default-free financial claim.  At a macro-level, it deters fragility within the financial system 
where a default may set off a domino effect, given a leveraged-dominant financial system 
(Minsky, 1992). 
4.2.3. Default-prone debt equilibrium 
A default-prone equilibrium, on the other hand, is endowed with a put option to default 
deep in-the-money.  As illustrated in Figure 2, the default-prone equilibrium suffers from 
potential default states prior to critical stage ‘Z’, and normal states beyond it.  In states prior 
to critical stage ‘Z’, the entrepreneur is technically in default, as the project payoffs are less 
than the maturity values of the collateralized debt (including the ‘profit’).  In the default 
states of the economy, the entrepreneur does not have the incentive to maintain the project’s 
payoffs indicated as ‘AB’ over the future states of the economy ‘OZ’.  This leads to a fall in 
the value of these payoffs to A′B′ over the defaulting states of the economy.  The 
quadrilateral AA′B′B thus constitutes the frictional cost of default, which serve as a proxy for 
the agency cost of debt. 
The greater the relative divergence of the project payoffs with the outstanding amount 
of the credit facility, the more is the value of the option to the entrepreneur.  In the 
foreclosure, the lender’s recovery rate (net of default cost) is contingent on the collateral 
value, given the non-recourse status of the credit facility.  Where the recovery rate is 
stochastic, a default-prone debt is quite an expensive option (Franks and Torous, 1989).  If 
the recovery rate is extremely low, default-prone financing is untenable, leading to 
pragmatically default-free financing as the only viable (and economically efficient) outcome. 
Given the risky equilibrium involves default in states of economy, the debt pricing 
structure warrants higher mark-up rate and debt ratio than a default-free one.  We thus find 
default-prone collateralized facility has an economic efficiency receding with increasing 
agency cost of debt (Ebrahim et al. 2014).  Even when agency cost is low, it ranks (at best) 
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economically-neutral to a default-free collateralized debt.  This is attributed to the debt 
pricing structure, conveying the agency cost of debt to the errant borrower.  This accounts for 
the disparate collateralized debt yield observed in empirical literature (Berger and Udell, 
1990; John et al., 2003).  Overall, the lender is better off with default-free collateralized debt 
by immunizing the put option to default. 
4.3. Illustrating the toxic effect of risky debt on its marketability 
Improvement of a short term liquid instrument is extremely important for economic 
development.  Securitization of the pragmatically default-free and default-prone securities 
ensuing from a credit sale (of a tangible asset) is illustrated in Figure 2.  The put option to 
default arising from a counterparty failure to repay the facility is mitigated by imposing a 
haircut or initial margin illustrated in Figure 3.  This is basically a fraction of the security 
market value and reflects the risk exposure of the buyer.  This haircut, reflecting the time 
value of money along with the agency cost of debt, increases with the riskiness of holding the 
collateralized security.  Thus, pragmatically default free facility commands a lower haircut in 
contrast to a higher one for a default-prone one (Figure 3).  It also serves as a cushion against 
the volatility of the market value of the collateral.  This may lead the lender (financial 
institution) to receive collateral with less value than the original amount of funds advanced 
during economic downturns. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Proposition: The prohibition of ribā forewarns on investing in toxic debt (with acute agency 
issues) as it infects the capital of investors.  In addition, the injunction of sale of debt (Bay' 
al-Dayn) illustrates that there is no antidote to this infection due to the freezing of the debt 
market. 
Proof:  Please see the Appendix. 
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4.4. Pricing pragmatically default-free collateralized debt to alleviate agency costs 
How does one pragmatically sterilize the option to default in a collateralized debt 
facility?  This involves curing the security from its endemic agency cost of debt.  This has 
major repercussions on the resilience of financial sector in light of our harrowing experience 
with collateralized lending in the recent financial crisis. 
Models of debt pricing fail to consider the welfare of both the principal and the agent 
from the perspective of agency theory (see Black-Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Jarrow-
Turnbull (1995) and Duffie-Singleton (1999)).  In this section, we resort to the Qur'ānic 
guidance on fragile free financial contracting.
20,
 
21
  We, thus, reinforce the undertaking of 
precautionary measures by alleviating the agency cost debt.  This is achieved by ensuring that 
the borrower does not convey the project risk to the lender.  That is, by ascertaining the put 
option to default is never in-the-money through the tenure of the contract.  This is attained by 
meticulously pricing the endogenous debt parameters (initial debt value, debt repayments, 
initial deposit and debt tenure); given the underlying exogenous factors (initial asset price, its 
mean and volatility, safety margin, borrower income and income multiplier), as elaborated 
below. 
Figures 4(i)-(iii) applies the Ebrahim (2009) analysis on a fully amortizing credit 
facility, involving a project (venture) with initial value ‘P0’, funded by trading financial 
claims on the project payoffs with a financial intermediary.
22
  To secure financing, 
entrepreneur places personal funds constituting of an initial deposit ‘ID’.  The amount 
                                                 
20 This involves exchanging deferred financial claims (categorized under the ribā injunction), which gives 
respite to borrowers (Q 2: 280).  We apply this in consort with the following recommendations: (i) 
suggesting the undertaking of precautions (Q 4: 71, 102); and (ii) fulfilling all obligations (Q 5:1). 
 
21 The undertaking of precautions in the Qur'ān (Q 4: 71, 102) is recommended for special war-like 
situations.  We have taken the interpretation literally as applying generally to all situations, in accordance 
with the traditions of Prophet Muhammad and his companions. 
 
22 The assumption of a fully amortizing loan is crucial in our analysis as it yields a concave lien profile.  This 
is in contrast to a partially amortizing loan, which has a convex lien profile. 
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financed ‘Q0’ is given by ‘Q0 = P0 − ID’.  The initial deposit is termed as a ‘skin-in-the-
game’, as it serves as a commitment device enforced on the borrower, reducing the borrower 
risk shifting behavior.  The amount financed (Q0) is stated as sum of the periodic debt 
repayments ‘Q0 = ∑ Aγ
tT
t=1 = Aγ (
1−γT
1−γ
)’, where γ ε (0, 1) is the discount factor. 
The outstanding credit balance ‘Qt’ is measured by the compounded initial debt value 
‘Q0(1 + r)
t’ and netted off by future value of annuitized periodical payments over the tenure 
of the lending facility, ‘𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄0(1 + 𝑟)
𝑡 − ∑ 𝐴𝑡𝑡=1 (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡−1’, where ‘𝑟’ and ‘𝐴’ signify the 
lender’s mark-up rate and annuitized periodical payments, respectively.  Asset prices are 
assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion, where future states are independent of past 
movements (see Efficient Market Hypothesis - Fama, 1970).  The asset dynamics is function 
of its value appreciation [depreciation] and risk profile across time.
23
  Thus, expected asset 
price at time ‘𝑡’ is defined by, ‘Pt = P0e
(μ−(
σ2
2
))t
’, where ‘μ’ and ‘σ’ signify the mean and 
standard deviation of the period (monthly) appreciation [depreciation] of the asset, 
respectively. 
Figure 4(i) presents a scenario where the entrepreneur’s expected equity is ‘underwater’ 
in period ‘t1’ to ‘t2’ i.e., ‘Pt < Qt’.  We assume that rational borrowers whose equity starts to 
move underwater at t1 will not automatically default.  Actual default occurs where the 
expected equity is significantly underwater.  That is, strategic default involves the borrower 
expectation of future asset prices and pecuniary [non-pecuniary] costs (e.g. income 
capability, effect on borrower credit score) substantially exceeding the benefits of continuing 
with the debt repayments (Foote et al., 2008; Archer and Smith, 2013). 
                                                 
23  One can include jump processes to asset prices by adding Poisson jumps to the diffusion (Merton, 1976).  
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Prudent underwriting warrants the satisfaction of both (i) loan-to-value (LTV); as well 
as (ii) income constraints.  The debt pricing mechanism here is consistent with Baltensperger 
(1978) who advocates incorporation of not only the mark-up rate but also the debt-to-value 
ratio and the tenure of the facility.  Foote et al. (2008) and Archer and Smith (2013) extend 
the analysis by including borrower’s income factors.24  This meticulous pricing of debt 
involves a more scientific approach and is in contrast to ad hoc credit rationing practices and 
overall loan loss rehabilitation programs observed in industry (Foote et al., 2008). 
[Insert Figures 4(i)-(iii) about here] 
4.4.1. Alleviating Risk-Shifting by Imposing LTV Constraint 
This subsection discusses the employment of precautionary measures reducing the 
fragility of the financial contract by curtailing the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.  This is in the 
form of a safety margin established by having a sufficient initial deposit (ID) to deter the 
default option into ever going in-the-money through the tenure of the credit facility.  Figures 
4(ii)-(iii) depict the asset value with upward and downward trends respectively.  In contrast to 
its default-prone counterpart, a pragmatically default-free one is characterized by safety 
margin that ensures the entrepreneur’s expected equity does not go underwater with very high 
probability.  This safety margin is pre-conditioned to different economic scenarios: One with 
an upward and a second with a downward trend in asset price (see again Figures 4(ii)-(iii)).  
The degree of safety margin required is contingent on specificities of the underlying project/ 
asset riskiness.
25
  Given the endogeneity of agency issues, collateral (that involves 
intangibility exacerbating opaqueness ‒ i.e. asymmetric information or gharar) suffers from 
                                                 
24  Foote et al. (2008) and Archer and Smith (2013) illustrate that debt-to-income ratio and unemployment rate 
positively influence the put option to default. 
 
25  The asset riskiness is impacted by its redeployability (Benmelech and Bergman, 2011); transaction/ 
dissipative costs (Boot et al., 1991; Jokivuolle and Puera, 2003), asset drift, volatility and correlation with 
other firm assets (Jokivuolle and Puera, 2003).  The duration gap between debt default and repossession of 
the collateral is also accounted for in assessing the asset value (Ebrahim et al., 2014).  See also Salleh et al. 
(2014) on the broad categories of collateral and the associated economic impact. 
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heightened ‘lemons’ problem.26  This obscurity calls for stricter safety margin due to the 
innate difficulties in pricing such instruments that is in accordance with asset risk. 
Our safety margin is undertaken as a multiple ‘α’ of the underlying asset riskiness 
‘σ√t’.  This involves the difference in the log function of the expected asset value and the 
loan value (at time t) to be probabilistically greater or equal to this prudent buffer, ‘(ln(Pt) −
ln(Qt)) ≥ ασ√t’.  Under this setting, the initial value of the debt (for an asset with an upward 
trend) is determined in such a way that at the optimum level, the value of the outstanding 
credit balance ‘Qt’ is always less than or equal to the asset price reduced by the safety 
margin, ‘Qt ≤ Pt(e
−ασ√t)’.  In other words, at point ‘t = 0’, the maximal debt value is 
capped at the underlying asset value.  That is, Q0 ≤ P0.  This leads to a debt-to-value ratio of 
100%, which aggravates moral hazard and thus financial fragility.  The maximal debt 
amount, for an asset with an upward trend, is thus capped at ‘Q0(Max) = P0(e
−ασ)’ to ensure 
sufficient ‘skin in the game’.  This yields the minimal initial deposit as a function of the 
underwriting asset value constraint along with the characteristics of assets ‘IDMin =
P0(1 − e
−ασ) (Ebrahim, 2009).27 
  
                                                 
26  See Coval et. al. (2009) for the effects of imprecisions in the: (i) pricing of structured products; and (ii) 
estimation of their default risk.  Rajan et. al. (2010) links this to the Lucas critique, that is, failure to 
appropriately recognize the behavior of the agent (borrower) and its impact on the underlying asset 
(collateral).  
 
27  It should be noted that when asset follows an upward trend, initial amount funded by the credit facility 
yields a corner solution in Ebrahim (2009).  In contrast, for an asset following a downward trend, we 
realize an interior solution (see Figure 4(iii)).  This is determined by solving for the optimal t* in Qt∗ =
Pt∗(e
−ασ√t∗) and working backwards to evaluate Q
0
, given its relationship with Q
t*
 and affordability (A
Max
) 
(see Subsections 4.4 and 4.4.2).  Once Q0 is evaluated, one can extend the analysis to determine the tenure 
of the lending facility in a process similar to the one described in Subsection 4.4.2. 
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4.4.2. Alleviating Underinvestment by Imposing Income Constraint
28
 
This subsection discusses the granting of sufficient credit (at the time of origination), 
facilitating its fulfilment, as elaborated earlier.  The repayment of the credit facility is 
contingent on (i) periodic annuitized payments ‘A’ (refer above); along with the (ii) income 
capability ‘y’ of the borrower.  Prudent underwriting necessitates that periodic payments be 
within the entrepreneur income capability, ‘
y
A
≥ b’, where ‘b’ is the underwriting income 
multiplier.  By rearranging this equation, one can restate the maximal periodic payment as, 
‘AMax =
y
b
’. 
The net debt equation ‘Q0 = Aγ (
1−γT
1−γ
)’ (from above) can thus be redefined as follows: 
‘Q0(Max) = AMaxγ (
1−γT
1−γ
)’.  Equating solutions of (i) ‘Q0(Max)’ and (ii) ‘AMax’ to derive the 
optimal debt tenure ‘TMax’, one realizes ‘P0e
−ασ =
y
b
[γ (
1−γT
1−γ
)]’.  By taking the natural 
logarithm of this function, the debt tenure is evaluated as, 
‘T ≤ TMax = {
ln[1−(P0e
−ασb(1−γ)) yγ⁄ ]
ln[γ]
}’.  This yields optimal debt tenure as a function of 
income of entrepreneur (y), underwriting asset value and income constraints (α and b), 
exogenous mark-up rate (
1 ‒ γ
γ
) along with asset characteristics (P0, σ) (see again Ebrahim, 
2009). 
Given the discount factor ranges from ‘0 < 𝛾 < 1’, the denominator on the right hand 
side (RHS) yields a negative number as ‘ln[γ] < 0’.  Thus, for ‘T’ to be a positive real 
number, the natural logarithm of the numerator in the RHS of the above equation must be a 
value in the interval (0, 1).  That is, ‘0 < [
1−(P0e
−ασb(1−γ))
yγ
] < 1’.  This equation links the 
                                                 
28  We assume no prior debt overhang to benefit from a reduction in the cost of funding (Stulz and Johnson, 
1985).  This is critical in attenuating the underinvestment issue. 
25 
 
 
 
underwriting parameters (α and b) with asset characteristics (in terms of initial price, P0 and 
volatility, σ) and agent characteristics (in terms of income, y, and discount parameter, γ). 
In summary, structuring pragmatically default-free collateralized credit facility involves 
calibrating its endogenous parameters (initial deposit, debt repayment, and tenure) pre-
conditioned on the exogenous parameters (initial collateral value and its asset volatility 
including the safety margin, discount factor, borrower income capacity and its multiplier). 
4.5. Recapitulation of Contract Design, Implementation and Enforcement 
The enforcement of the legal rights of investors (i.e., creditors), in the case of default 
(of Islamic debt securities), matters more than the law enshrined in books (see Djankov et al., 
2008; Bae and Goyal, 2009).  This is of primary importance in cross border transactions 
where the issuer is located in one jurisdiction, securitizes the assets in another that is 
subscribed by investors across different locations.  Contract litigation may also be subject to 
double jeopardy whereby investors may seek redress in a Shariʹāh (Islamic) court of law on 
top of the common law that is generally in place.  Thus, investor (or creditor) protection is of 
vital importance and underlays the model discussed in Subsection 4.1-4.4 above. 
First, investor protection in our model goes beyond the ring-fencing of the underlying 
debt claims described in the literature on making the assets ‘bankruptcy remote’ (see Ayotte 
and Gaon, 2011).  By recommending: (i) securitization of debt claims backed by tangible 
assets, and (ii) the underwriting of iron-clad covenants in the indenture of the contract, our 
study mitigates both ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information (i.e., both adverse selection 
and moral hazard respectively).  Second, by advocating the employment of a conceptual 
model and an algorithm developed in Ebrahim (2009) as described in Subsection 4.4, our 
study alleviates agency costs of debt (i.e, both risk shifting as well as the underinvestment 
risks).  The reduction of adverse selection, moral hazard and subsequently risk-shifting 
decrease the borrower’s cost of funding, thereby easing his/ her cash flow constraints, which 
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in turn alleviates underinvestment risks.  Thus, our study not only diminishes the legal risk of 
creditors (i.e., investors) but also the investment risk of the ultimate borrowers.  The model 
exemplifies a solution towards mitigating fragility in financial contract whereby rights of 
both parties, creditors and ultimate borrowers, are enhanced.  This not only alleviates the risk 
of default at the micro-level but also makes the economy more resilient and stimulates growth 
at the macro-level. 
5. Conclusion 
The freezing of the debt market in the recent financial crisis illustrates its emasculation 
ensuing from information asymmetry (gharar) and agency issues (ribā) endemic in the 
securitization of claims backed by intangible assets.  The regulatory response to this issue 
extended to money market funds is pathetic and is ridiculed by practitioners (Foley, 2014a).  
It imposes: (i) ad hoc discounting of net asset value (NAV); (ii) redemption fees; and (iii) 
suspension of liquidation under market dry ups (or when the fund gets in trouble).  This 
indicates that the regulatory response is reactive and does not pre-emptively address the 
shortcomings of securitization. 
This paper sheds light on the rationale behind liquidity dry ups and illustrates a 
proactive approach to ensure the continuous marketability of fixed income securities.  We 
coherently rationalize cultural, i.e., Islamic injunctions to cure the structural flaws endemic in 
securitized debt.  We first illustrate that the medieval classification of assets into tangible 
('ayn) versus intangible (dayn) is primarily to deter opacity, i.e., to alleviate information 
asymmetry (gharar).  Next, we modify the Lucas tree model (Martin, 2013) to rationalize the 
prohibition of ribā and the injunction of sale of debt (Bay' al-dayn) as deterring agents from 
investing in ‘toxic’ unmarketable assets.  This alleviates debt markets standstills, as witnessed 
in the recent crisis.  Thus, we rationalize the Islamic injunction of the sale of debt 
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collateralized by intangible assets as exacerbating the agency cost of debt leading to the 
expropriation of agents’ assets. 
Furthermore, we employ the Qur'ānic advice on risk management and the prudent 
undertaking of obligations (such as debt) to mitigate the endogenous agency cost of debt.  
This is demonstrated by conceptually illustrating that the borrower’s equity is never 
underwater.  That is, by illustrating that the borrower’s Put option to default is never in-the-
money through the tenure of the facility.  This alleviation of risk-shifting sterilizes the 
‘toxicity’ of risky debt.  This helps lower the cost of funding of an entrepreneur thus reducing 
the underinvestment issue.  This subsequently frees the entrepreneur’s cash flow constraint 
enabling him/ her to undertake more viable projects in the real economy thus stimulating 
growth.  Policymakers and regulators should reinforce default-free pricing of debts 
collateralized by tangible assets.  This endows transparency in their trading.  It also leads to 
efficiency as it results in a complete market setting which is not only resilient to shocks, but 
also reduces funding constraints on businesses.  This efficiency vitalizes economic growth. 
Finally, this study offers a fresh perspective in the interpretation of Islamic cultural 
values that will contribute towards advancement of financial instruments, institutions and 
markets of Muslim economies. 
6. Appendix 
Proof of Proposition: 
The prohibition of ribā basically cautions economic agents on investing in debt with acute 
agency issues as it can infect their capital.  This is illustrated by: (i) the quadrilateral ABB'A', 
which represents the risk-shifting aspect of the agency cost of debt in Figure 2; and (ii) the 
region OS in Figure 3.  One can also illustrate this mathematically by incorporating the 
agency issues in the pricing of risky debt in a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE).  This 
is conducted by pricing in the: (i) demand for risky debt, emanating from the borrower; and 
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(ii) supply of risky debt emanating from financier.  These two are equated to arrive at the 
unique interior loan amount disbursed and the cost of funding taking into account the agency 
issues.  This solution is in variance with the capital structure theorems as stated in Footnote 7.  
The mathematical proof of this is available on request. 
Redeeming oneself from this infection by expunging risky debt is not feasible due to freezing 
of debt markets.  This is inferred from the injunction of the sale of debt as explained as 
follows.  The pricing of a one-period security can be evaluated by amending the Lucas tree 
model (Martin, 2013) in an overlapping generation’s economy with unequal lives.  This 
involves a framework where the seller of a fixed income security is viewed to be an early 
generation, born at time t, retired at (t+β) and dead after this period.  Here β is assumed to be 
strictly less than 1.  This is in contradiction to the buyer of the security, who is viewed to be a 
later generation, born at (t+β), retired at (t+1) and dead after this period.  We assume further 
that the: (i) states of the nature (default versus normal, for the risky security) are revealed 
only in period t+1; and (ii) securities are sold at a discount. 
Pricing a Default-Prone, i.e., Risky (R) security 
The offer price of a security demanded by seller (stemming from the supply side of funding) 
is incorporated in the period (t+β) consumption parameters as given below. 
Pt, R Et{[
U'(ct+β
~
)
U'(ct)
] [P(t+β)-Ask-R
~
]} (1a) 
Where: ct+β, j = P(t+β)-Ask-R, j, contingent on state j of the economy in period (t+β). (1b) 
 ct = et ‒ Pt, R (1c) 
In contrast, the bid price of a Risky security supplied by a buyer (stemming from the demand 
side of financing) is given by: 
P(t+β)-Bid-R, j' E(t+β), j{[
V'(c't+1
~
)
V'(c't+β)
] [Payoffs
t+1
~
]} state j of the economy in period (t+β) (2a) 
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Where: c'(t+1), k = State k dependent payoffs in period (t+1) (as illustrated in Figure 3) (2b) 
 c'(t+β), j = e'(t+β) ‒ P(t+β)-Bid-R, j, contingent on state j of the economy. (2c) 
In the above equation, U(.) and V(.) represents the strictly concave and twice differentiable 
(Von Neumann ‒ Morgenstern) utility functions, and' represent the discount factors, while 
c(t+β) and ct [c'(t+1) and c'(t+β)] signify the times (t+β) and t [(t+1) and (t+β)] consumption 
parameters for seller and buyer of security respectively.  The economic intuition behind the 
security pricing functions is that of consumption smoothing.  Investors defer their 
consumption across time from periods of high resources to low ones. 
Here, the payoffs of risky debt allow us to expand Equation (2a) as given below. 
P(t+β)-Bid-R, j'




t
∞
[
V'(c'(t+1) k
~
)
V'(c'(t+β) j)
][Payoffs(t+1) k
~
]dx (3a)
29
 
='




0
S
[
V'(c'(t+1) k
~
)
V'(c'(t+β) j)
][Payoffs(t+1) k
~
]dx '




S
Z
[
V'(c'(t+1) k
~
)
V'(c'(t+β) j)
][Payoffs(t+1) k
~
]dx '




Z
∞
[
V'(c'(t+1) k
~
)
V'(c'(t+β) j)
](Pt+1)dx
  (3b) 
Where: Payoffs(t+1) k
~
 ≤ 0,  k ε [0, S] 
 Payoffs(t+1) k
~
 ≥ 0,  k ε [S, Z] and 
 Payoffs(t+1) k
~
 = Pt+1 = Maturity Value of Security,  k ε [Z, ∞). 
Assuming no market frictions, equilibrium requires: P(t+β), R, j = P(t+β)-Ask-R, j = P(t+β)-Bid-R, j.  This 
is not feasible as the valuation of P(t+β)-Bid-R, j is not deterministic.  This inability is attributed 
to the problems of evaluating the marginal utility and thus the inter-temporal marginal rate of 
                                                 
29 The variable of integration x is defined in terms of the probability density function of terminal payoffs 
(f(·)) as follows: dx = f(payoffs
(t+1)
) d(payoffs
(t+1)
). 
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substitution [
V'(c'(t+1) k
~
)
V'(c'(t+β) j)
] in the states OS of the economy in period 1 as c'(t+1), k ≤ 0  k ε [0, 
S].  This leads to a freeze in the pricing of a risky security vindicating the injunction of sale 
of debt. 
It should be noted that the above situation is not true in the case of a default-free credit 
security as the payoffs are constant and positive in all states of the economy.  This leads to 
the deterministic values of the inter-temporal marginal rates of substitution for both the buyer 
and seller of the security as illustrated below. 
Pricing a Default-Free (DF)) security 
The offer price of a DF security demanded by seller at time (t+β) is given as follows. 
Pt, DF {[
U'(ct+β)
U'(ct)
] [P(t+β)-Ask-DF]} (4a) 
Where: ct+β = P(t+β)-Ask-DF, independent of the state j of the economy in period (t+β). (4b) 
 ct = et ‒ Pt, DF (4c) 
In contrast, the bid price of a DF security supplied by a buyer is given as follows: 
P(t+β)-Bid-DF'{[
V'(c't+1)
V'(c't+β)
] [P
t+1
]}, independent of the state j of the economy. (5a) 
Where: c'(t+1) = Pt+1
 = Maturity Value of a DF Security, independent of the state k of the 
economy in period (t+1). (5b) 
 c'(t+β) = e'(t+β) ‒ P(t+β)-Bid-DF, independent on state j of the economy. (5c) 
Assuming no market frictions, equilibrium requires: P(t+β), DF = P(t+β)-Ask-DF = P(t+β)-Bid-DF.  This 
equilibrium is relatively easier to realize in contrast to the risky debt as the valuation of   
P(t+β)-DF is deterministic. 
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Our analysis thus illustrates that both the prohibition of ribā and the injunction of 
Bay'al-Dayn have credence from an economic perspective, as they have the capacity of 
improving the efficiency of the financial intermediation system. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Securitization and Illiquidity 
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Figure 2: Asset transformation in financial institutions 
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Figure 3: Default-prone and default-free collateralised debt payoffs 
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Figure 4: Default-prone and default-free debt structure over states of economy 
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Glossary of Arabic terms 
'Ayn Tangible Asset. 
Bay' Sale. 
Bay' al-Dayn Sale of Debt. 
Bay' al-Dayn 
Bi'l Dayn 
Offsetting of a debt by another akin to leveraged loan prevalent in 
the structure of a retail financial intermediary or a carry trade. 
Dayn Intangible asset like a debt or a liability or an obligation. 
Gharar This involves market manipulation stemming from asymmetric 
information. 
'Hadīth Tradition of Prophet Muhammad. 
Qur’ān The holy book of Islam. 
Ribā An injunction protecting property rights.  This is generally 
misinterpreted as usury or interest. 
Ribawī A debilitating exchange of financial claims. 
Shariʹāh Islamic law. 
Sukuk Securitized Islamic financial facility backed by tangible assets. 
Sunnah The body of traditional, social and legal custom and practice of the 
Islamic community. Along with the Qur’ān and Hadith (recorded 
sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), it is a major source of 
Shari’ah, or Islamic law. 
 
